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Abstract: This article considers a recent initiative to launch cultural property ‘safe havens’: 
places which can be used to protect cultural property threatened by terrorism and armed 
conflict. The article criticises this action, particularly in terms of the way in which it removes 
local populations and human agency from discussion of the potential workings of these 
locations. To do so, the article draws a comparison with UNESCO’s International Campaign 
to Save the Monuments of Nubia during the 1960s and 1970s, which similarly removed local 
populations from its work. Meanwhile, the article also questions the morality of protecting 
cultural property from destruction while failing to protect populations subject to warfare and 
terrorism from the same fate. Finally, the article suggests some possible solutions to this 
problematic situation.    
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What does it mean to be ‘safe,’ and what does it mean to be ‘endangered’? Who defines these 
terms, why, and what does this act of definition allow them to do? In December 2016, a 
conference entitled “Safeguarding Endangered Cultural Heritage” took place in Abu Dhabi, 
organised jointly by the governments of the United Arab Emirates and France, and held under 
the patronage of UNESCO. The Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayed 
Al Nahyan, was in attendance, as was French President François Hollande and the Director-
General of UNESCO, Irina Bokova; many other dignitaries joined them. The diplomatic 
spectacle was a sight to behold. The assembled, distinctly elite, group seemed to have given 
itself sole authority to speak for and about cultural heritage around the world.  
 
In this short piece, I want to reflect on the ramifications of this situation, not least because the 
pronouncements emanating from the conference’s podium were so attention-grabbing. Al 
Nahyan stated that “the destruction of heritage sites by terrorist groups, and illicit trafficking 
by groups that aim to obliterate the international heritage of humanity, are rejected by all 
God-given religions and human nature.” Not to be outdone, Hollande, discussing the policies 
put forward at the conference, announced that “this work is part of the battle led by France 
and the UAE against obscurantism, for openness and culture.” As part of this “battle,” the 
conference proposed setting up a global network of ‘safe havens’ to protect cultural property 
endangered by terrorism and armed conflict, a proposal closely resembling the 2015 
Protocols for Safe Havens for Works of Cultural Significance from Countries in Crisis issued 
by the Association of Art Museum Directors (AAMD), which allow “‘owners’ of material in 
jeopardy … [to] request that a participating AAMD member museum hold the material until 
it can be safely returned” (Kersel 2016–2017, 4). The conference also proposed an 
international fund to help the financing of initiatives connected to this work. As The Art 
Newspaper reported, “France has started the fund off with $30m, the UAE has added $15m, 
and it is expected that public and private contributions will take it to at least $100m” (Cocks 
2016).  
 
Through these announcements, the conference’s attendees suggested something quite 
striking. As in the case of the capital being used to finance the safe havens proposed by the 
conference, it seems that it is the ability to move freely and liberally—without apparent 
bother from regulatory or legislative obstacles—that now defines the effective status and 
existence of cultural objects, at least according to a certain brand of international diplomacy. 
If governments and international agencies are able to establish the conditions within which 
this circulation can take place, it almost seems as if artefacts should find their way to safe 
havens themselves; ‘owners’ (presumably, in this instance, implying nation-states) should see 
the benefits of the situation at once and let the system get on with its work unencumbered. 
Simultaneously, the people who dwell with such items on an everyday basis, giving these 
things their meaning, are left out of the equation. People who have a significant claim to the 
‘ownership’ and definition of cultural objects are ignored, even as they too are threatened 
with life-changing—and life-ending—destruction by conflict and terrorism. 
 
We have been close to this sort of situation before, a state of affairs whose consequences are 
worth reflecting on. UNESCO at least partially built the authority of its 1972 World Heritage 
Convention on the work conducted during the 1960s and 1970s as part of its International 
Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia. The Campaign, whose most famous acts remain 
the transfer of the temples at Abu Simbel and Philae to locations above the floodwaters of the 
Aswan High Dam, was itself dependent on a trust fund, and partially predicated on the 
negotiated ability of monuments and excavated objects to move to places—and countries—
other than where archaeologists excavated them. The end result of this process, as Lucia 
Allais (2012, 208) has noted, enabled UNESCO to represent itself as having created and set 
into circulation new and logical “patterns of mobility for knowledge, people, and capital” at a 
remove from the geopolitics of the High Dam itself.  
 
The problem is that it takes an enormous suspension of disbelief to concur not only that these 
patterns worked as easily and apolitically as UNESCO likes to purport, but also that they 
were not instead dependent on human interactions, choices, and asymmetries throughout their 
effective lifespan. For instance, the construction of the Aswan High Dam—as well as being 
responsible for the deaths of many labourers—was also dependent on the movement of an 
entire, geopolitically divided population away from monuments and archaeological remains, 
which were consequently recorded (as was the norm) as free from human contact. A separate, 
Ford Foundation-funded ethnological campaign surveyed the lives of Egyptian Nubians 
before they were relocated northwards (Hopkins and Mehanna 2010). But the Sudanese 
Nubians, bar a census and a statistical survey predicated on making their own emigration 
southwards as efficient as possible (Dafalla 1975), apparently warranted less effort. Everyone 
in Nubia was equal, but some people seemed to be more equal than others.  
 
The consequences of this situation are fairly striking, not least in the way that the Nubian 
‘right-to-return’ has become an increasingly live political issue (Janmyr 2016). Meanwhile, 
last summer, I came across a display panel in the National Museum in Warsaw detailing how 
the institution “acquired 67 wall paintings,” among various other objects from Nubia. The 
rest of the artefacts from Polish work during the Nubian campaign, the panel informs us, 
“found their way to the Sudan National Museum in Khartoum” (fig. 1). But for anything to 
‘find its way’ required conversations between archaeologists and government officials and a 
division of excavated artefacts to be decided on and take place. It also required the Nubians 
who lived in and around the places where these things were excavated to acquiesce to their 
state-appointed fates. Giving the Warsaw objects agency removes the reality that this agency 
was produced by human beings making choices and having choices enacted upon them. It 
removes the objects on display from the human interactions that gave—and give—them 
meaning. The situation is a bit, one might suggest, like that of an apparently freewheeling 
object on its way to a safe haven. 
 
There are difficult questions at stake here. Morag Kersel has discussed the positives and 
negatives of cultural property safe havens in detail, also noting that “there is no doubt that 
landscapes, museums, and artifacts across [in this instance] the Middle East face ongoing 
threats” (2016–2017, 14). No one would deny that things are threatened, even as it is the act 
of digging, whether archaeological excavation or looting, that turns things into the cultural 
property on which this threat is enacted. But how has the particular assemblage of 
institutions, objects, capital, and people represented by the Nubian campaign once again 
come together in the form of the Abu Dhabi conference? How is it possible to suggest the 
efficacy of the cultural property “safe haven” at the same time as other immanent safe havens 
have so obviously failed to come into being? Why is it possible to ‘save’ things, but not save 
the relationship of things to the people that give them meaning, and not, in fact, save people 
at all?        
   
In Aleppo, two weeks after the “Safeguarding Endangered Cultural Heritage” conference 
took place, the devastated city’s remaining inhabitants were waiting for the Assad regime’s 
Russian-backed forces to close in. At best, reports were desperate. At worst, they involved 
summary executions and Syrians recording, online, what they feared would be their final 
moments. Even as organisations like the International Red Cross called for controlled 
evacuations to take place, safe havens were sorely lacking. Much of the world had been able 
to demonstrate its concern for a dehumanised representation of ancient Palmyra that erased 
contemporary Tadmur, the location of the site, from existence.2 Somehow, though, the people 
of contemporary Aleppo were treated differently.  
 And here lies the final, grim irony. By appropriating the terminology of warfare and creating 
“safe spaces” for cultural property, we not only create a dubious moral equivalence between 
sites, objects, and the people who live in and around them. By dehumanising representations 
of such places, we also take that equivalence away at the same time as we dehumanise the 
refugees and others who we have collectively failed to assist. Cultural property can now 
move more freely—and, as a commodity, is often valued more highly—than people, whether 
in terms of the sort of initiative announced in Abu Dhabi or in terms of the art market that 
helps to fuel looting. We let some goods keep on moving and classify other, human ‘goods’ 
as not good at all.  
 
We need to re-think our priorities, and to do so in a way that considers the lives of people 
above all else. Taking humanitarian crisis into consideration, neither international 
conferences attended by a select group of diplomats nor the freewheeling capital pledged at 
them are sufficient to address what it means for something—or someone—to be safe. Objects 
on their way to well-financed safe havens are objects torn from meaning unless their 
relationship to people is made explicit, and unless the people who have helped make their 
meaning are not only safe, but also part of the conversation. If cultural property safe havens 
are going to exist (and it certainly seems as if they will exist, at least in the near future),3 then 
their existence needs to be coupled to the ongoing existence of the lives connected to the 
objects stored in them. For all their rhetoric about saving the heritage of humanity, historical 
events like the Nubian campaign failed to conceive of cultural property as connected to 
people. There is no reason to make the same mistake again.      
                                                 
1 This is an edited, re-worked version of a piece originally published on my personal blog at 
http://williamcarruthers.wordpress.com on December 19 2016.  
2 A point made forcefully by Michael Press (2016), for instance. 
3 The fund launched at the Abu Dhabi conference has, at the time of writing, raised $75 million (Noce 2017).  
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Caption for Figure 1: Display panel, National Museum in Warsaw, Poland (photo copyright 
William Carruthers 17 June 2016). 
 
  
